Slow but certain descent into chaos

Chinmaya R. Gharekhan

Can something be done to prevent a disaster from taking place in and around Syria?
 
Is Syria already in the throes of a civil war? What are its implications for the region? Whither Arab Spring? What is the state of play in the Arab League? How is the great game between the Shias and the Sunnis, led by Iran and Saudi Arabia, being played out? How are India's interests affected?
 
All experts agree that Syria is a pivotal country in the region. Libya, during Muammar Qadhafi's reign, pretended to assert a role for itself beyond its inherent strength. He did manage to buy a few loyal supporters in Africa with his oil money but had no ally in the Arab world. What happened in Libya will not have consequences for others in the region, particularly since the two Arab countries with which it shares borders have already experienced the ‘spring.' Syria, on the other hand, has always been one of the most significant actors in West Asia, with a dynamic, proactive approach. A destabilised Syria will seriously destabilise the neighbours, with far-reaching consequences, some of which might be palatable to some and not so to others. This explains the somewhat “hands-off” attitude of the “international community” so far because it does not know how to deal with the Syrian regime.
 
Unlike as in Egypt and Tunisia, the opposition in Syria has not been peaceful or non-violent, almost from the beginning. The protesters have often been well armed in the confrontation with the security forces. More than 3,000 civilians have lost their lives according to the United Nations; a large number of security personnel too, perhaps running into several hundreds, have been killed. A new and potentially ominous — ominous because it brings the country closer to a civil war — development is the defection of some members of the army and their getting organised into an effective force, called the Free Syrian Army, to attack government installations.
 
The Assad regime was not much worried thus far because the army and the security agencies have been fully behind it. If there is a breach in the ranks of the army and parts of it openly engage in anti-regime violence, the regime can be expected to fight back with full ferocity. It could well be a case of ‘you-ain't-seen-nothing-so-far.' The fact that Turkey, for whatever reasons, is hosting the opposition and offering it assistance not restricted to humanitarian, and Jordan, whose King has openly called upon Mr. Assad to step down, indicates the certainty of external powers getting dragged into the civil war. One can be confident that foreign involvement will not be limited to these two countries. It should not take long for Iran and Saudi Arabia to step in for their own reasons. Lebanon, of course, will be the most adversely affected.
 
In the event of civil war

Should the situation develop into a full-fledged civil war, it would last a long time. The Lebanese civil war lasted 14 years. The regime will be fighting for survival — political and, crucially, physical. The majority Sunni community, led by the Muslim Brotherhood types, will seek revenge for all the atrocities suffered by them at the hands of the minority Alawite Shia government over the decades. Logic would suggest that Israel, for one, would not welcome the installation of a hard-line, Islamist regime in Damascus, not an unlikely outcome of a civil war. However, for Israel, and hence automatically for the U.S., the highest priority is Iran; if Iran is made to lose its most important ally in the region, it would be worth any price. Iran will lose not only Syria but also access to the Hezbollah in Lebanon and to the political leaders of Hamas, some of whom are reported to have moved to Egypt in recent times. The removal of the Assad regime would be a huge, even if short-term, gain for Israel.
 
There is one factor which just might be of help to the Assad regime. In case of a civil war, the significant Christian community will also suffer severely, precisely because of its pro-Assad orientation, which in turn is explained by the regime's secular character. Would the western powers wish to encourage such a contingency?
 
What we are witnessing today is Syria's slow but certain descent into chaos, a process which the world would surely wish to avoid but seems helpless. The international community will say with justification that Mr. Assad was given more than ample opportunity to introduce political and economic reforms which, he says, he has always wanted to and still does. But that was in the past. Can something be done now to prevent a disaster from taking place in and around Syria?
 
The West and the Arab governments, as well as Turkey, can give Mr. Assad one more opportunity. They can fix a reasonable time frame, not an absurd three or seven days' ultimatum, for him to carry out the reforms. They should at the same time — and this is important — call upon the opposition groups to stop all violence while retaining their right to stage peaceful protests. The Syrian government will definitely strike back in case of any violence anywhere in the country. So it should not be provoked or given an opportunity to justify the use of force. If, at the end of this period, credible reforms have not been implemented, there will likely be more support for sanctions on the regime. The Arab League must not get carried away by its own rhetoric or by the aggressive lobbying of some of its members. It should avoid the temptation of appearing to act tough or “principled,” and delay submitting the matter to the United Nations Security Council. Once the matter goes to the Security Council, the downhill acceleration will not be possible to stop.

The Arab League vote a few days ago —18 in favour of suspending Syria, 3 against and 1 abstention — was most revealing. Syria's own vote against is natural and Yemen's negative vote is easily explainable. Lebanon's opposition to the suspension is indicative of the domestic political set-up in the country; the Hezbollah, primarily a Shia movement, is part of the ruling coalition, with a veto-wielding share in the government. Iraq's abstention is even more significant. A government which owes so much to the U.S. has publicly adopted, in effect, a pro-Assad stance; this has a lot to do with the fact that the government in Baghdad is led by the Shia community. The Shia-Sunni tensions and the consequent Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry are very much a factor in all this drama.
 
Arab League action

On the other hand, the Arab League action was, no doubt, also influenced by the winds — that have become mild in recent days — that have blown over the Arab world. How can Egypt, recently liberated from an autocratic rule, not oppose an autocratic regime elsewhere?
 
As for the Arab Spring, the only country where it appears to have blossomed is where it all began — Tunisia. Tunisia has already had its election, in which a ‘moderate' Islamic party has gained the highest vote, not an absolute majority. In Egypt, there are question marks, although it too is heading for an election later this month. The reason for doubts regarding Egypt is that the army is a strong factor — which was not the case in Tunisia — and seems reluctant to give up its privileged position, not least in the economic sphere. It is believed by some that the reason the army did not stand by Hosni Mubarak is that he was grooming his son, a businessman and non-army man, to be his successor.
 
In the Security Council, the governments define their positions on political considerations, rarely on only merits of the situation. They first decide how to vote and then proceed to find a rationale. Sometimes the situation is so clear-cut that there is no room for any wiggle. Such was the case when Saddam Hussein tried to swallow Kuwait in August 1990. Today's Syrian situation is infinitely more complex.
 
What should India do? If the assessment is that Syria is heading for a civil war, a case could be made for abstention, since we would not like to take sides in an internal strife. On the other hand, if the Arab League were to make a formal request for sanctions, it would be difficult for us not to support the consequent action in the Security Council. The people of India rightly want their government to exercise an ‘independent' foreign policy, but ‘independence' should not mean merely a policy different from that of western powers. “Genuine” independence calls for an approach designed to protect and further our interests, irrespective of whom it pleases or displeases.